Swedish neutrality

Swedish neutrality refers to Sweden's policy of neutrality in all armed conflicts, which has been in effect since the early 19th century. The policy originated laregely as a result of Sweden's involvement in the Napoleonic Wars, which had very negative consequences for the country, including the loss of Finland (the eastern third of the kingdom) and territories. The general dissatisfaction with these events resulted in a nonviolent revolution, which instated a new royal dynasty, Bernadotte a new constitution, and a new foreign policy, which declared Sweden's neutrality. Since this time, Sweden has been involved in no armed conflicts.

The Policy of 1812

The new foreign policy, often called the Policy of 1812, was directed by Jean Baptiste Bernadotte, the elected crown prince, and was the reversal of Sweden's traditional foreign politics. If Sweden was to participate in adventurous projects, such as warfare, then it had to be as a minor partner in winning coalitions. Sweden actively courted the Napoleonic Empire and Imperial Russia, the archenemy who had defeated Sweden in 1809. Revanchism was the absolute anathema.

During the First War of Schleswig, from 1848 to 1851, Swedish troops were located on Jutland as support for Denmark against Prussian-supported rebels; however, the Swedes never experienced any combat.

After 40 years of successful trust-building to Russia, Sweden took no chances in the Crimean War, despite the possibility of a revision of the harsh peace of 1809. Although Sweden concluded an alliance with Britain and France, (November 25, 1855), the country did not engage in warfare.

At the Second war of Schleswig, the Riksdag of the Estates refused to fulfill King Charles XV's promises of military support; and Sweden observed a strict neutrality. This neutrality turned to be advantageous. Prussia would soon forge and dominate Imperial Germany, and was no suitable foe for Sweden — whose relative strength had diminished strikingly since its zenith during the Thirty Years' War.

World War I

Prussia's dominance made the following 40 years peaceful in the Baltic region, and at the outbreak of World War I neutrality seemed natural to many Swedes. Although the feelings of cultural and scientific kinship with the German Empire were strong in Sweden, so were also the mercantile and personal ties with Britain and France. The opinion was split between Conservatives, with sympathies for Germany, and Liberals, with more mixed sympathies. Organized, but politically less influential, were the Social Democrats, who were in many cases pacifists and opposed to the war. The neutralist stance was reinforced when Denmark and Norway remained neutral. Voices for neutrality dominated the public debate, but Queen Victoria and some conservatives were strong advocates for entrance in the war on the German side, and the government's policy got a clearly pro-German list.

In 1916, the pro-German policy was wrecked, having resulted in famine, rebellious opinions, and no tangible advantages. Once again, the impression impregnated the Swedish society, that strict neutrality was the most suitable for Sweden. A new, less German-minded Conservative cabinet was appointed, and to calm the social unrest, democratic reforms were promptly initiated, that cemented Sweden's neutralist policy, and would soon lead to the still lasting political hegemony of Social Democrats.

When the collective security system of the League of Nations started to crack with the Abyssinia crisis, and World War II approached, Sweden could look back on 120 years of successful neutralist politics – with one singular exception: the backup force on Jutland during the First war of Schleswig. Sweden now pursued a policy of forging a block of neutralist countries in Northern Europe. Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, Finland and the Baltic countries were all members of this club of neutral states. Of them, only Sweden was lucky enough to remain unattacked.

Åland Islands

Main article: Åland crisis

The politician who stood as the biggest thorn in the side of the government was the Swedish Foreign Minister, Rickard Sandler (1932–36, 1936–39). Sandler strongly opposed the government's policy of strict neutrality, feeling it necessary that the government relax its stringent policy. Sandler expressed a desire to defend the Åland Islands from either German or Soviet control, by mining the area around the islands in conjunction with the Finnish government.

The Åland Islands are of extremely strategically important in the Baltic. Lying at the base of the Gulf of Bothnia, the Åland Islands are situated along all the sea traffic that comes in and out of the Gulf, and are within range of Sweden, Finland and the Baltic states to the east.

Prior to 1809, Sweden controlled the Åland Islands, but was forced to give up all control of the islands, along with Finland, in the Treaty of Fredrikshamn on September 17, 1809, to Russia, despite the fact that 90 percent of the island's inhabitants were Swedish. In the Treaty of Paris of April 18, 1856, Russia was required to withhold the construction of any new fortifications on the islands, which Russia obeyed, despite unsuccessfully attempting to change the status of the islands in 1908.

In 1914, however, the Russian government turned the islands into a submarine base for the use of British and Russian submarines during the First World War. In December of 1917, the Finnish government proclaimed that Finland was a sovereign state and a dispute over whether the islands belonged to Sweden or Finland ensued. In 1921, again despite the fact that 90 percent of the islands population was Swedish—and that they expressed a desire of being incorporated into Sweden—the League of Nations granted the Åland Islands to Finnish control.

Despite Sweden's grievances over losing control of the islands to Finland in 1921, all difficulties between Sweden and Finland were resolved by the mid-1930s. The fear of the Åland islands falling under the influence of Germany or Soviet Union was very real, and that is why Sandler proposed defending the status of the islands.

However, the Swedish government opposed Sandler's proposal, in that it was felt that this would set a precedent for further moves, moves that might provoke an invasion from either Germany, the Soviet Union or both. When a new coalition was formed to represent Sweden's policy of neutrality, in light of the Russo-Finnish War, Sandler was dropped from the new lineup of ministers. It was at first believed that the Swedish government dropped Sandler due to his outspoken comments on the government's policies, and the German press' allegations that Sandler was pro-British. Actually it was Sandler who requested permission to retire from the Swedish cabinet, because the government did not represent Sandler's anti-neutral views.

Armed Neutrality

See also: Sweden during World War II

The 1930s marked a new period when Sweden's long-standing policy of neutrality was severely tested on numerous occasions, most of which came from a strongly rejuvenated nationalistic Germany. Since the founding of the League of Nations in 1919 and up until the year 1935, Sweden had been a strong supporter of the League and most of its energy on the international stage had been put into its preservation.

Opposition to this new policy of armed neutrality was weak in that all major parties, such as the Conservatives, Agrarians and People's Party, supported the government's position. On a regular basis, beginning in 1936, the Swedish government requested increases in its defense budget to strengthen its military preparedness as the international situation continued to worsen from 1936 onwards. The actual military budget from 1936 to 1939 increased many times over. In 1936, military spending was $37,000,000; 1937, $50,000,000; 1938, $58,575,000; and in 1939 it was at $322,325,000. After the war began itself, military spending peaked in 1942 at $527,575,000 in one year alone. With the increased demand of an expanded military, Swedish industry was required to not only supply the increased demand of domestic products, exacerbated by the German blockade of the North Sea, it also had to meet an increased demand in military armaments for the Swedish government. Before the war, production of armaments did not exceed more than tens of millions of Swedish kronor, but during the war, production exceeded the cost of one billion Swedish kronor ($240,000,000).

Significance of the Neutrality Policy

The fate of the Swedish nation largely rested upon the outcomes of distant battles and the policies of distant governments, events outside the control of Swedish politicians and diplomats. Had certain battles or policies during the war been different, Sweden's ability at attaining a successful policy of neutrality may very well have not succeeded. Germany's attack and occupation of both Norway and Denmark, coupled with the fact that Finland was battling the Soviets, made Sweden's position extremely tenuous, in that countries on both sides of the European conflict were poised on Sweden's borders and could potentially strike at any moment. As previously mentioned, Germany had considered a Swedish invasion, and with Germany occupying both Norway and Denmark, Germany's ability to attack Sweden was a significant concern. Sweden was forced to act upon the whims and orders of a belligerent Germany.

Had the war continued for a longer period of time, Germany or the Allies may have had no choice but to invade Sweden in order to thwart enemy advances. Had that happened, Sweden's policy of neutrality would have been a thing of the past. If Germany had been able to sustain its successes on the battlefield beyond 1943, and been capable at bringing the war to an end favourable to its own terms, Sweden would have had no choice but to join the new order of Europe, a new order under the domination of Nazi Germany. Germany would not have allowed a country to exist on the sidelines in the new order of Europe, and Sweden would have had to abandon its policy of neutrality. However, German domination of Europe did not succeed and Sweden was left on its own. Sweden's ability to maintain its policy of neutrality until the war's end was due in large part to luck, since events out of its control played the largest part in the fate Sweden's policy of neutrality.

However, Sweden should be given credit, in that Sweden was able to move along with the events occurring all around its borders. Prime Minister Hansson and the government were able to maneouver the country effectively through the course of the war, avoiding the devastating losses and destruction that a war might have brought upon Sweden.

Scandinavian defence union

Main article: Scandinavian defense union

A Scandinavian defense union that would have included Sweden, Norway and Denmark was planned between the three countries after World War II. The three countries would if they had entered into an alliance, have remained separate sovereign countries but acted as a single bloc in foreign policy and security issues. The proposed union was being discussed by a joint Scandinavian committee during the winter of 1948-1949, but the Cold War tension between the United States and the Soviet Union, and preparations for a western alliance that would result in the North Atlantic Treaty superceded the Scandinavian negotiations.

When it became known that the western alliance would not be able to supply the Scandinavian countries with armaments before meeting their own pressing needs, this issue ultimately proved to be the turning point for Norway, which resigned from the talks. Denmark was still willing to enter into an alliance with Sweden, but the Swedes saw few advantages in this and the proposal fell. Norway and Denmark subsequently became signatory parties of the North Atlantic Treaty and members of NATO.

See also

• List of Swedish wars