Roper v. Simmons

Roper v. Simmons (2005) was a case before the Supreme Court of the United States, which ruled on March 1, 2005, that it is unconstitutional to impose capital punishment for crimes committed while under the age of 18, in a 5–4 decision.

The bench

The makeup of the Supreme Court and their opinions were:

Majority opinion

• Written by: Justice Anthony Kennedy
  • Joined by: Justices David Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen Breyer
• Separate opinion: John Paul Stevens

Dissenting

• Written by: Justice Antonin Scalia
  • Joined by: Chief Justice William Rehnquist and Justice Clarence Thomas
• Separate dissent: Justice Sandra Day O'Connor

The case

This case, which originated in Missouri, involves Christopher Simmons, who in 1993 at the age of 17, concocted the plan to murder Shirley Crook, bringing two younger friends—Charles Benjamin and John Tessmer, into the plot. The plan was to commit burglary and murder by breaking and entering, tying up a victim, and tossing the victim off a bridge. The three met in the middle of the night; however, Tessmer then dropped out of the plot. The two— Simmons and Benjamin—broke into Mrs. Crook's home, bound her hands and covered her eyes. They drove her to a state park and threw her off a bridge.

Once this case was brought to trial, the evidence against Simmons was overwhelming, pointing to his guilt. He had confessed to the murder, performed a videotaped reenactment at the crime scene, and there was testimony from Tessmer against Simmons that showed premeditation (he discussed the plot in advance and later bragged about the crime). The jury returned a guilty verdict. Even considering mitigating factors (no prior criminal history, sympathy from Simmons' family, and most importantly his age), the jury nonetheless imposed a death sentence. Simmons' case was appealed, citing ineffective trial support. His age, and thus impulsiveness, along with a troubled background were brought up as issues. The trial court upheld the jury's death sentence.

The case worked its way up the court system, with the courts continuing to uphold the death sentence. However, in light of a 2003 U.S. Supreme Court ruling, in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), that overturned the death penalty for the mentally retarded, the Missouri Supreme Court reconsidered Simmons' case and concluded that "a national consensus has developed against the execution of juvenile offenders" and sentenced Simmons to life imprisonment without parole.

The State of Missouri appealed the decision to the US Supreme Court, which agreed to hear the case. (The name of the action, Roper v. Simmons, comes from the names of Donald P. Roper, a Missouri Dept of Corrections official, who was a party to the action in official name only, and Christopher Simmons, who was the defendant in the original action).

The ruling

The case was argued on October 13, 2004. The constitutionality of capital punishment for persons who were juveniles when their crimes were committed was put into question, citing the Eighth Amendment that protects individuals from cruel and unusual punishment.

Previously, a 1988 Supreme Court decision Thompson v. Oklahoma barred execution of offenders under the age of 16. In 1989, another case, Stanford v. Kentucky upheld the possibility of capital punishment for offenders who are 16 or 17 years old when they committed the capital offense. The same day in 1989, the Supreme Court ruled in the case, Penry v. Lynaugh, that it was permissible to execute the mentally retarded. However, in 2003, that decision was reconsidered in Atkins v. Virginia, citing that decency standards had evolved and execution of the mentally retarded was now considered to be cruel and unusual punishment and thus unconstitutional.

This case, Roper v. Simmons, brought the issue to the table again. In question, is whether it is Constitutionally permissible to execute an offender who committed a capital crime while under the age of 18. As in the issue of executing the mentally retarded, the Supreme Court has now decided that society’s standards have evolved since the 1989 case of Thompson v. Oklahoma and that it is indeed cruel and unusual punishment to execute a juvenile, under age 18.

Supporting this "evolving standard", is the body of scientific and sociological research¹ that finds juveniles have a lack of maturity and sense of responsibility, compared to adults. Adolescents are overrepresented statistically in virtually every category of reckless behavior. In recognition of the comparative immaturity and irresponsibility of juveniles, almost every State prohibits those under age 18 from voting, serving on juries, or marrying without parental consent. Juveniles are also more vulnerable to negative influences and outside pressures, including peer pressure. They have less control, or experience with control, over their own environment. They also lack the freedom that adults have, in escaping a criminogenic setting.

Another key basis of support for the “national consensus” on the death penalty for juveniles is the increasing infrequency that it is applied at the state level. While 20 states have the juvenile death penalty on the books, only six states have executed prisoners for crimes committed as juveniles, since 1989. And, just three states have done so in the past 10 years: Oklahoma, Texas, and Virginia. Furthermore, five of the states that allowed the juvenile death penalty at the time of the 1989 case have since abolished it. Thus, the execution of juveniles is indeed becoming increasingly unusual in the United States and a “national consensus” has developed.

In evaluating whether penalties violate the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, the Supreme Court has taken guidance from the law of foreign countries and international bodies. Since 1990, only seven other countries – Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and China – have executed juveniles. Since then, however, each of those seven countries has either abolished the death penalty for juveniles or made public disavowal of the practice. Now, one finds the stark reality that the United States stand alone, as the only country in the world that continues to allow execution of juveniles. Furthermore, only the United States and Somalia have yet to ratify Article 37 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (September 2, 1990), which expressly prohibits capital punishment for crimes committed by juveniles.

In drawing the line at 18 years of age for actions with death eligibility, the Supreme Court considered that is also where society draws the line between childhood and adulthood for a multitude of other purposes, overturning its holding in Stanford v. Kentucky that such a consideration was irrelevant.

The dissent

Both the Scalia dissent, joined by Rehnquist and Thomas, and Justice O’Connor’s separate dissent put into question whether a “national consensus” had indeed formed among the state laws. At the time of the ruling 18 of 38 death penalty states (47%) allowed the execution of juveniles.

However, the primary objection of the Court's two originalists, Scalia and Thomas, is not whether such a consensus has developed or not, but why that should be relevant. From an originalist perspective, the question presented by Roper v. Simmons is very different to the question the Court answer in its verdict; from an originalist perspective, the question is not "does society now frown on the execution of minors, and if it does, how can we accomodate that view?", but rather, "was the execution of a minor considered cruel and unusual at the point at which the Bill of Rights was ratified?".

In addition, and for much the same reason, Scalia also objects in general to the Court's wilingness to take guidance from foreign law in interpreting the Constitution; his dissent questions not only the relevance of foreign law, but also accuses the court of "invok[ing] alien law when it agrees with one's own thinking, and ignor[ing] it otherwise", noting that in the case of abortion U.S. laws are less restrictive than the international norm. In a roundtable discussion with Justice Breyer, at American University Law School, Scalia posed the question: "what is the criterion for whether or not to adopt foreign precedent? That it agrees with you?".

Scalia also attacked the majority opinion as being fundamentally anti-democratic. His dissent cites a passage from the Federalist Papers in arguing that the role of the judiciary in the constiutional scheme is to interpret the law as formulated in democratically selected legislatures. In other words, Scalia argues that the job of the court is to rule what the law says, not what the law should say, even if what the law says might be considered "wrong" when viewed in terms of an "evolving standard of decency"; it is for the legislature, acting in the manner prescribed in Article V of the U.S. Constitution, to offer amendments to the Constitution in light of the evolving standard of decency, not for the Court to arbitrarily make de facto amendments. He challenges in very strong terms the right of unelected "lawyers" to discern moral values and to impose them on the people in the name of flexible readings of the constitutional text. In general, Scalia favors the right of states to make decisions on issues such as capital punishment. This Supreme Court decision overrides those decisions made by the states.

Implications

Constitutional Jurisprudence

The majority ruling highlights several controversies in the field of constitutional jurisprudence. The first is the use of the concept of an evolving "national consensus" to allow for the re-interpretation of previous rulings. What constitutes evidence for such a consensus – and from where the judicial branch derives its authority to determine it and implement it into law, a function constitutionally vested in the legislative branch – especially in the case of capital punishment, is unclear at this point. In Roper v. Simmons the majority cited the abolishment of juvenile capital punishment in 32 states (20 of the 38 allowing capital punishment) as evidence of such a consensus. In Atkins v. Virginia it was the "consensus" of the 25 states (13 of 38 allowing capital punishment) that had banned execution of the mildly retraded.

Another controversy is the role of foreign laws and norms in the interpretation of U.S. law. In 2004 Florida Representative Tom Feeney introduced a non-binding resolution instructing the judiciary to ignore foreign precedent when making their rulings. Said Feeney: "This resolution advises the courts that it is improper for them to substitute foreign law for American law or the American Constitution. To the extent they deliberately ignore Congress' admonishment, they are no longer engaging in 'good behavior' in the meaning of the Constitution and they may subject themselves to the ultimate remedy, which would be impeachment."[1]

Beltway Sniper Case

The implications of this ruling were immediately felt in the State of Virginia, where it is now certain that Lee Boyd Malvo will not face the death penalty. He is responsible in part, along with John Allen Muhammad, for the DC sniper attacks that terrorized the Washington DC area in October 2002 when he was 17 years old. He had already been spared the death penalty in his first trial for the murder of FBI employee Linda Franklin outside a Home Depot store in Falls Church, Virginia. In October 2004, under a plea-agreement, Malvo plead guilty in another case in Spotsylvania County for another murder to avoid a possible death penalty sentence, and agreed to additional sentencing of life imprisonment without parole. Malvo had yet to face trial in Prince William County, Virginia. However, in light of this Supreme Court decision, the prosecutors in Prince William County have decided not pursue the charges against Malvo, after all. Prosecutors in Maryland, Louisiana and Alabama are still interested in putting both Malvo and Muhammad on trial.

At the outset of the Beltway sniper prosecutions, the primary reason for extraditing the two suspects from Maryland, where they were arrested, to Virginia, was in fact the differences in how the two states deal with the death penalty. While the death penalty is allowed in Maryland, it is only applied to persons who were adults at the time of their crimes, whereas Virginia had also allowed the death penalty for offenders who had been juveniles when their crimes were committed. At the time of the Roper v. Simmons ruling, Malvo was 20 years old, and was held at Virginia's maximum security Red Onion State Prison in Pound in Wise County, Virginia.

Source

• Roper v. Simmons – Official U.S. Supreme Court opinion March 1, 2005
• Lane, Charles (March 2, 2005) 5–4 Supreme Court Abolishes Juvenile Executions The Washington Post, p. A01.

• Boorstein, Michelle (October 27, 2004) Malvo Gets Two More Life Terms, Teen Sniper Enters Plea In Spotsylvania Attacks The Washington Post, p. B01.

References

Note 1: While the Supreme Court did not cite specific research studies, their arguments are well-grounded in the substantial body of scientific and sociological research that recognizes the mental/developmental differences between adults and adolescents. In fact, neither the majority nor dissenting opinions put the research into question. The references listed below go into great detail about these differences, the development of the human mind, and its capacity for judgment which might not fully mature until the age of 25.

• Cauffman, Elizabeth and Laurence Steinberg. (2000). (Im)maturity of Judgment in Adolescence: Why Adolescents May Be Less Culpable Than Adults Behavioral Sciences and the Law 18, 741–760.
• Scott, Elizabeth S. and Thomas Grisso. (1997). Evolution of Adolescence: A Developmental Perspective on Juvenile Justice Reform Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 88(1), 137–189.
• Sowell, Elizabeth R., Paul M. Thompson, Keven D. Tessner, and Arthur W. Toga. (2001). Mapping Continued Brain Growth and Gray Matter Density Reduction in Dorsal Frontal Cortex: Inverse Relationships during Postadolescent Brain Maturation The Journal of Neuroscience 21(22), 8819–8829.
• National Institute of Mental Health. (2001). Teenage Brain: A work in progress, A brief overview of research into brain development during adolescence. NIH Publication No. 01–4929.
• Gerencher, Kristen (Feb. 2, 2005). Understand your teen's brain to be a better parent. Detroit Free Press.