Knowledge is the awareness and understanding of facts, truths or information gained in the form of experience or learning (a posteriori), or through introspection (a priori). Knowledge is an appreciation of the possession of interconnected details which, in isolation, are of lesser value.
Knowledge is a term with many meanings depending on context, but is (as a rule) closely related to such concepts as meaning, information, instruction, communication, representation, learning and mental stimulus.
Knowledge is distinct from simple information. Both knowledge and information consist of true statements, but knowledge is information that has a purpose or use. Philosophers would describe this as information associated with intentionality. The study of knowledge is called epistemology.
A common definition of knowledge is that it consists of justified true belief. This definition derives from Plato's Theaetetus. It is considered to set out necessary, but not sufficient, conditions for some statement to count as knowledge.
What constitutes knowledge, certainty and truth are controversial issues. These issues are debated by philosophers, social scientists, and historians. Ludwig Wittgenstein wrote "On Certainty" – aphorisms on these concepts – exploring relationships between knowledge and certainty. A thread of his concern has become an entire field, the philosophy of action.
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Distinguishing knowing that from knowing how
Suppose that Fred says to you: "The fastest swimming stroke is the front crawl. One performs the front crawl by oscillating the legs at the hip, and moving the arms in an approximately circular motion". Here, Fred has propositional knowledge of swimming and how to perform the front crawl.
However, if Fred acquired this propositional knowledge from an encyclopedia, he will not have acquired the skill of swimming: he has some propositional knowledge, but does not have any procedural knowledge or "know-how". In general, one can demonstrate know-how by performing the task in question, but it is harder to demonstrate propositional knowledge.
A short definition: Knowledge is the ability to take action, or in some cases, not take action. In Fred's case, above, after jumping in the pool – he 'knows' to take action by swimming or he risks drowning. Jumping in the pool with information about swimming or propositional knowledge about swimming may not be applied in time to save Fred's life. Presumably, beyond knowledge, comes wisdom – should Fred have jumped in the deep end of the pool so soon after eating lunch?
A priori vs. a posteriori knowledge
A priori knowledge is knowledge gained or justified by reason alone, without the direct or indirect influence of experience (here, experience usually means observation of the world through sense perception.)
A posteriori knowledge is any other sort of knowledge; that is, knowledge the attainment or justification of which requires reference to experience. This is also called empirical knowledge.
One of the fundamental questions in epistemology is whether there is any non-trivial a priori knowledge. Generally speaking rationalists believe that there is, while empiricists believe that all knowledge is ultimately derived from some kind of external experience.
Empiricists have traditionally denied that even these fields could be a priori knowledge. Two common arguments are that these sorts of knowledge can only be derived from experience (as John Stuart Mill argued), and that they do not constitute "real" knowledge (as David Hume argued).
Adoption of Knowledge
Through experience, observation, and inference, individuals and cultures gain knowledge. The spread of this knowledge is examined by diffusion. Diffusion of innovations theory explores the factors that lead people to become aware, try, and adopt new ideas and practices — this can help to explain development of knowledge.
Knowledge in philosophy and the problem of justification
For most of philosophical history, "knowledge" was taken to mean a belief that was justified as true to an absolute certainty. Any less justified beliefs were called mere "probable opinion." Philosophers often define knowledge as a justified, true belief; the branch of philosophy that deals with the nature, origin and scope of knowledge is called epistemology.
But how do we show that our beliefs are knowledge? Justification and evidence are both epistemic features of belief. They are, in other words, both qualities that indicate that the belief is true. We could try out other epistemic features in the definition of knowledge, if we wanted to. Instead of "justified true belief" or "true belief with evidence," we could say that knowledge is "rational true belief" or "warranted true belief." For our purposes, the differences between these different options don't matter. The whole point is that, to be knowledge, a belief has to have some positive epistemic feature; it can't be arbitrary or random or irrational. The Theory of justification deals with these issues in more detail.
A problem with defining knowledge is known as the "Gettier problem". The Gettier problem arises when we give certain kinds of counterexamples to the JTB (justified true belief) definition. A counterexample is a case where the definition applies, but the word defined doesn't; or a case where the word defined applies, but the definition doesn't. Gettier counterexamples are examples where the definition, justified, true belief applies; but one nevertheless still doesn't have knowledge, so the word "knowledge" doesn't apply in that case.
Externalist responses to the Gettier problem
Gettier's article was published in 1963. Right after that, for a good decade or more, there was an enormous number of articles trying to supply the missing fourth condition of knowledge. The big project was to try to figure out the "X" in the equation, Knowledge = belief + truth + justification + X. Whenever someone proposed an answer, someone else would come up with a new counterexample to shoot down that definition.
Some of the proposed solutions involve factors external to the agent. These responses are therefore called externalism. For example, one externalist response to the Gettier problem is to say that the justified, true belief must be caused (in the right sort of way) by the relevant facts.
When scientists or philosophers ask "Is knowledge possible?", they mean to say "Am I ever sufficiently justified in believing something in order to have knowledge?" Adherents of Philosophical skepticism often say "no". Philosophical skepticism is the position which critically examines whether the knowledge and perceptions people have is true; adherents of this position hold that one can never obtain true knowledge, since justification is never certain. This is a different position from Scientific skepticism, which is the practical stance that one should not accept the veracity of claims until solid evidence is produced.
- Analytic proposition/Synthetic proposition
- A priori/A posteriori
- Knowledge creation
- Knowledge engineering
- Knowledge management
- Knowledge relativity
- Knowledge representation
- Philosophical skepticism
- Propositional knowledge
- The Gettier problem: Justified true belief?
- Theory of Knowledge: The Gettier problem
- The Duality of Knowledge
- Philosophy of Knowledge Glossary
- Creath, Richard, "Induction and the Gettier Problem", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol.LII, No.2, June 1992.
- Feldman, Richard, "An Alleged Defect in Gettier Counterexamples", Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 52 (1974): 68–69.
- Gettier, Edmund, "Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?", Analysis 23 (1963): 121–23.
- Goldman, Alvin I., "Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge", Journal of Philosophy, 73.20 (1976), 771–791.
- Hetherington, Stephen, "Actually Knowing", The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol.48, No. 193, October 1998.
- Lehrer, Keith and Thomas D. Paxon, Jr., "Knowledge: Undefeated Justified True Belief", The Journal of Philosophy, 66.8 (1969), 225–237.
- Levi, Don S., "The Gettier Problem and the Parable of the Ten Coins", Philosophy, 70, 1995.
- Swain, Marshall, "Epistemic Defeasibility", American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol.II, No.I, January 1974.