Kafr Qasim massacre
The Kafr Qasim massacre took place in the Israeli Arab village of Kafr Qasim (multiple transliterations possible: Kafr/Kfar Kassem/Qassem/Qasim, etc) October 29, 1956. It was carried out by the Israel Border Police (MAGAV) and resulted in 49 dead, including 15 women and 11 children aged 8 to 15.
On that day, the Suez War had just begun. Although Jordan was not involved in the war, it was expected and hoped that Jordan would enter the conflict on Egypt's side (Morris, Righeous Victims, p.289). Therefore troops were stationed along the Israeli-Jordanian frontier. A brigade of the Border Police led by Colonel Issachar Shadmi was ordered to prepare itself to defend a section close to the border known as the "Little Triangle". The Little Triangle was a number of villages close to the border, not far from Tel Aviv, where about 40,000 Israeli Arab citizens lived.
The same day, on Shadmi's initiative, a nighly curfew was imposed upon all Arab villages in the area close to the Jordanian border from 5 p.m. to 6 a.m. He summoned Major Shmuel Malinki, in charge of the Border Guard unit at the village of Kafr Qasim, to his headquarter and informed him about the curfew.
In the court hearing after the massacre, Malinki claimed that when he asked Shadmi what was to happen to a man returning from his work outside the village, without knowing about the curfew, that Shadmi had replied: "I don't want any sentimentality" and "That's just too bad for him" (quoted in Jiryis, The Arabs in Israel, p.140–141).
Shadmi denied having given Malinki an order to shot and kill the villagers. Malinki claimed that "the order was not of a kind that did not conform to the spirit of the times".
Major Malinki issued a similar order to the reserve forces attached to his battalion, shortly before the curfew was enforced: "No inhabitants shall be allowed to leave his home during the curfew. Anyone leaving his home shall be shot; there shall be no arrests." (ibid., p.141)
At 4.30 p.m., only 30 minutes before the harsh curfew was to come into effect, the mukhtar (mayor) of Kafr Qasim was informed of the new time. He asked what would happen to the about 400 villagers working outside the village in the fields that wasn't aware of the new time. An officer assured him that they would be taken care of. Between 5 p.m and 6 p.m. the platoon, led by Gabriel Dahan, that was stationed in Kafr Qasim killed nineteen men, six women, ten teenage boys (age 1417), six girls (age 1215), and seven young boys (age 813), most at close range with automatic weapons and rifles. Arabs from a nearby village were brought in to dig a mass grave.
The initial reaction of the Israeli government was to impose strict censorship on the incident, while conducting an internal enquiry. However, after two weeks news of the massacre leaked out as private individuals and one Communist Knesset Member Tawfiq Tubi managed to publicise the event despite censorship. To limit bad publicity, a military cordon was maintained around the village for months, preventing journalists from approaching.
After a massive public campaign and a general strike, the Ben-Gurion government reluctantly agreed to bring the commanders responsible for the massacre to trial. (Rosenthal, 'Operation Hafarferet'). The resulting court-martial sentenced eleven Border Police officers and soldiers to relatively light prison terms for the crime committed. Malinki received 17 and Dahan 15 years imprisonment. The burden of responsibility was placed upon Colonel Shadmi who the court found responsible for the killing to a greater extent than any of the other persons involved. However, a second court (February 29, 1959) found him guilty of a minor administrative offence and fined him one grush (a small coin). The New York Herald Tribune of February 27, 1959 reported that Shadmi was sentenced to "a token fine of two cents for exceeding his authority by imposing an absolute curfew on an Arab village in Israel in 1956".
All of the guilty were out of prison by November 1959, due to presidential pardons or remissions. Soon after his release, Malinki was promoted and put in charge of security for the top secret Dimona nuclear reactor. Dahan got a job as a manager of the sale of Israel's government bonds in a European capital.
As a result of the Kafr Qasim case, the Israeli Supreme Court made a landmark ruling on the obligation of soldiers to disobey manifestly illegal orders. Judge Halevy stated that "The distinguishing mark of a manifestly illegal order is that above such an order should fly, like a black flag, a warning saying: 'Prohibited!'."
See also: Operation Hafarferet
References
- Shira Robinson, Local struggle, national struggle: Palestinian responses to the Kafr Qasim massacre and its aftermath, 1956 66, International Journal of Middle East Studies, vol 35 (2003), 393416.
External links
- Kfar Kassem home page
- Report of Israeli Cabinet deliberations
- Nur Masalha, Toward the Palestinian Refugees
Categories: Israeli-Palestinian conflict | 1956 | Massacres