Cyprus dispute

The "Cyprus Dispute" refers to the dispute between Turkey, Greece, Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots over Cyprus, an island in the eastern Mediterranean Sea. This dispute led to the de facto separation of the island into a mostly Greek speaking southern and a mostly Turkish-speaking northern part, the latter having been occupied by Turkish troops since 1974.

Enosis or Taksim? The starting point of the conflict

Under Ottoman Rule: 1821 – 1914

The idea of Cyprus' union with Greece – enosis (Ένωσις) dates back to the Greek War of Independence (1821 – see History of Modern Greece). The mid-19th century European attention on the new Kingdom of Greece and the excitement over the Megali Idea crystalized the idea among many prominent Greek Cypriots that they could anticipate eventual unification with the "motherland".

The Ottoman Empire ceded Cyprus to Great Britain in 1878 as part of an agreement with the British to deter Russian expansion into areas occupied by the Ottoman Empire. At the reception for the first British High Commissioner held in Larnaka, the bishop of Kition delivered a welcome speech in which he asked the British to expedite enosis for Cyprus as it had done with the Ionian Islands in 1864.

Cyprus had been largely ignored by the Sublime Porte, and the quality of life on the island was not very high. In the late 19th century, Cyprus technically remained the sovereign territory of the Ottomans while under the administration of the British. Turkish Cypriots were very skeptical of enosis as they feared retaliation and oppression once the island came under Athens' administration.

British Colonial Rule: 1914 – 1948

When the First World War began in 1914, Britain annexed Cyprus and offered it to Constantine I of Greece on condition that Greece enter the war on the side of the British. Although the offer was declined in favor of Greece's remaining neutral, this close brush with enosis galvanized both Greek and Turkish Cypriots to support or oppose the policy. After the foundation of the Republic of Turkey in 1923, the new Turkish government formally recognized Britain's ownership of Cyprus. Part of the agreement stipulated that the outstanding "rent" that London had never paid to the Ottomans for its lease of Cyprus between 1878 and 1914 should be paid off. In turn, Britain raised taxes on the Cypriots in order to cover the cost of its payment.

These policies, in addition to the brewing tensions between the two communities, led to open rebellion in 1931. A riot resulted in the death of six civilians, injuries to others, and the burning of the British Government House in Lefkosia. About 2,000 people were convicted of crimes in connection with the violence.

Britain reacted by imposing harsh restrictions. Military reinforcements were dispatched to the island, the constitution suspended, press censorship instituted, and political parties banned. Two bishops and eight other prominent citizens directly implicated in the riot were exiled. In effect, the governor became a dictator, empowered to rule by decree. Municipal elections were suspended, and until 1943 all municipal officials were appointed by the government. The governor was to be assisted by an Executive Council, and two years later an Advisory Council was established; both councils consisted only of appointees and were restricted to advising on domestic matters only. In addition, the flying of Greek or Turkish flags or the public display of portraits of Greek or Turkish heroes was forbidden.

In 1946, the British government announced plans to invite Cypriots to form a Consultative Assembly to discuss a new constitution. As a demonstration of good will, the British also allowed the return of the 1931 exiles. Instead of reacting positively, as expected by the British, the Greek Cypriot hierarchy reacted angrily because there had been no mention of enosis. The Orthodox Church of Cyprus had expressed its disapproval, and twenty-two Greek Cypriots declined to appear, stating that enosis was their sole political aim.

The idea of "enosis and only enosis" became more attractive to the general population. The Church of Cyprus solidified its control over the Greek Cypriot community, intensifying its activities for enosis and opposing communism. Prominent among its leaders was Bishop Makarios, spiritual and secular leader of the Greek Cypriots. The Church's main opposition came from the Cypriot Communist Party (officially the Progressive Party of the Working People; Ανορθωτικό Κόμμα Εργαζόμενου Λαού; or AKEL), which viewed itself as the alternative political voice to the Orthodox Church of Cyprus, also shifted its own platform from backing full self-government to supporting enosis, even though the right-wing government in Greece was hostile to communism.

The Makarios era begins: 1948 – 1960

On June 13, 1948, Bishop Makarios was elevated to Archbishop Makarios III in the Cathedral of Larnaka. In his inaugural speech, he vowed not to rest until union with "mother Greece" had been achieved.

In Athens, enosis was a common topic of conversation, and a Cypriot native, Colonel George Grivas, was becoming known for his strong views on the subject. In anticipation of an armed struggle to achieve enosis, Grivas visited Cyprus in July 1951. He discussed his ideas with Makarios but was disappointed by the archbishop's reservations about the effectiveness of a guerrilla uprising. From the beginning, and throughout their relationship, Grivas resented having to share leadership with the archbishop. Makarios, concerned about Grivas's extremism from their very first meeting, preferred to continue diplomatic efforts, particularly efforts to get the UN involved. The feelings of uneasiness that arose between them never dissipated. In the end, the two became enemies.

In August 1954, Greece's UN representative formally requested that self-determination for the people of Cyprus be included on the agenda of the General Assembly's next session. Turkey rejected the idea of the union of Cyprus and Greece. The Turkish Cypriot community had consistently opposed the Greek Cypriot enosis movement, but had generally abstained from direct action because under British rule the Turkish minority status and identity were protected. The expressed attitude of the Cypriot Turks was that, when Britain withdrew, control of Cyprus should simply revert to Turkey – although Turkey gave up all rights and claims to Cyprus in the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne.

Turkish Cypriot identification with Turkey had grown stronger, and after 1954 the Turkish government had become increasingly involved as the Cyprus problem became an international issue.

In the late summer and fall of 1954, the Cyprus problem intensified. On Cyprus, the colonial government threatened advocates of enosis with up to five years' imprisonment. In December, the UN General Assembly announced the decision "not to consider the problem further for the time being, because it does not appear appropriate to adopt a resolution on the question of Cyprus." Reaction to the setback at the UN was immediate and violent, resulting in the worst rioting in Cyprus since 1931.

In January 1955, Grivas founded the National Organization of Cypriot Fighters (Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston – EOKA). On April 1, 1955, EOKA opened a campaign of violence against British rule in a well-coordinated series of attacks on police, military, and other government installations in Lefkosia, Famagusta, Larnaka, and Lemesos. This resulted in the deaths of over 100 British servicemen and personnel and Greek Cypriot collaborators.

A bombing incident at the Turkish consulate in Thessaloniki, Greece, in June led to serious rioting in İstanbul and İzmir. It was later learned that the bombing had been carried out by a Turk, and that the riots had been prearranged by the government of Turkey to bring pressure on the Greeks and to show the world that Turks were keenly interested in Cyprus. Greece reacted by withdrawing its representatives from the NATO headquarters in Turkey, and relations between the two NATO partners became quite strained.

In 1957 the Turkish Resistance Organization (Türk Mukavemet Teskilati – TMT), a terrorist group that fought for Turkish Cypriot interests was founded. In response to the growing demand for enosis, a number of Turkish Cypriots became convinced that the only way to protect the interests and identity of the Turkish Cypriot population in the event of enosis would be to divide the island – 'taksim' ("division" in Turkish) into a Greek sector and a Turkish sector. The TMT's targets included many prominent Turkish Cypriot journalists, politicians and lawyers who supported independecne. It deliberately staged attacks on Turkish Cypriots in order to put false blame on the Greek Cypriots and create clashes.

While the British branded EOKA a terrorist organization and hung its members who are still considered by the Greek Cypriots as national heroes they did nothing to stop the TMT's violent campaign.

In 1958 the Turkish press office in Nicosia was blown up by the TMT on the orders of the Turkish foreign ministry. Afterwards the TMT murdered eight unarmed Greek Cypriot civilians that were deliberately stranded by the British SBA authorities near the Turkish Cypriot populated village of Geunyeli in a totally unprovoked attack. The riots in Nicosia caused by the bomb in the Turkish press office, resulted in the deaths of 56 Greek and 53 Turkish Cypriots.

Beginning in December 1958, representatives of Greece and Turkey opened discussions of the Cyprus issue. Participants for the first time discussed the concept of an independent Cyprus, i.e., neither enosis nor taksim. Subsequent talks yielded a compromise agreement supporting independence, laying the foundations of the Republic of Cyprus. The scene then shifted to London, where the Greek and Turkish representatives were joined by representatives of the Greek Cypriots, the Turkish Cypriots, and the British. The Zurich-London agreements that became the basis for the Cyprus constitution of 1960 were the Treaty of Establishment, the Treaty of Guarantee, and the Treaty of Alliance.

The general tone of the agreements was one of compromise. Greek Cypriots, especially members of organizations such as EOKA, expressed disappointment because enosis had not been attained. Turkish Cypriots, however, welcomed the agreements and set aside their demand for taksim. According to the Treaty of Establishment, Britain retained sovereignty over 256 square kilometers, which became the Dhekelia Sovereign Base Area, to the northwest of Larnaka, and the Akrotiri Sovereign Base Area to the southwest of Lemesos.

Cyprus achieved independence on August 16, 1960.

A Troubled Republic: 1960 – 1974

The constitution and its consequences

According to constitutional arrangements, Cyprus was to become an independent, non-aligned republic with a Greek Cypriot president and a Turkish Cypriot vice-president; a council of ministers with a ratio of seven Greeks to three Turks instead of in proportion to the composition of the population which was 82% to 18%. A House of Representatives of fifty members, also with a seven-to-three ratio, were to be separately elected by communal balloting on a universal suffrage basis. The judicial system would be headed by a Supreme Constitutional Court, composed of one Greek Cypriot and one Turkish Cypriot and presided over by a contracted judge from a neutral country. In addition, separate Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot Communal Chambers were provided to exercise control in matters of religion, culture, and education. According to Article 78(2) any law imposing duties or taxes shall require a simple majority of the representatives elected by the Greek and Turkish communities respectively taking part in the vote. Legislation on other subjects was to take place by simple majority but again the President and the Vice-President had the same right of veto--absolute on foreign affairs, defence and internal security, delaying on other matters--as in the Council of Ministers.

Overall, the constitution was a very complex legal document, and from the very beginning, its practical functionality was disputed.

EOKA, TMT, and the Akritas Plan

Underground organizations of both communities revived during 1961 and 1962. Officially disbanded in 1959, EOKA, along with the TMT, began training again, smuggling weapons in from Greece and Turkey, and working closely with national military contingents from Greece and Turkey that were stationed on the island in accordance with the Treaty of Alliance.

Some Greek Cypriots believed the constitutional impasse could be ended through bold action. Accordingly, a plan of action – the Akritas Plan – was drawn up sometime in 1963 by the Greek Cypriot minister of the interior, a close associate of Archbishop Makarios. The plan, published in fact by a Greek Cypriot newspaper, naturally called the attention of many Turkish Cypriots, and was used by the TMT to underline their point of view.

The plan's course of action began with persuading the international community that concessions made to the Turkish Cypriots were too extensive and that the constitution had to be reformed if the island were to have a functioning government. Another of the plan's goals was the revocation of the Treaty of Guarantee and the Treaty of Alliance in order to consolidate independence after the rejection of enosis. The plan foresaw that the Turkish Cypriots would refuse to accept these changes and if the Turkish Cypriots decided to resist any paramilitary action should be countered only by the use of legal means and force should be avoided except as a last resort in which case it should be decisive so that "no outside, intervention would be either justified or possible." If violent Turkish attacks became widespread then the declaration of enosis would be considered.

The events of 1963 and their consequences

On November 30, 1963, Makarios advanced a thirteen-point proposal designed, in his view, to eliminate impediments to the functioning of the government. The thirteen points involved constitutional revisions, including the abandonment of the veto power by both the president and the vice president. Turkey rejected it on December 16, declaring the proposal an attempt to undermine the constitution. Most of the Turkish Cypriots, including Vice-President Fazil Küçük, withdrew from the government, and Turkey withdrew diplomatic recognition of Cyprus' government.

In this politically charged atmosphere, violent unrest erupted after a police shoot-out; attacks by Turkish as well as Greek Cypriot paramilitary forces on the other ethnicity and on Cypriot security forces as well as hostage taking by both sides repeatedly took place. Turkish paramilitaries captured the Lefkosia to Kyrenia main highway to use as a bridge-head for a Turkish invasion and Turkish commandos were parachuted into Cyprus to assist the paramilitaries but most of these were shot down by the Cypriot security forces and Greek Cypriot civilians. At the same time, Greece and Turkey (both NATO member countries at the time) were on the brink of military confrontation. Following the passing of Security Council resolution 186 of March 4, 1964, the UN established the United Nations Peace-keeping Force on Cyprus (UNFICYP), and the two ethnic groups started to separate themselves. The same resolution gave the Cyprus government a mandate "to take all additional measures necessary to stop violence and bloodshed in Cyprus."

In total approximately 350 Turkish Cypriots and 200 Greek Cypriots are known to have lost their lives.

Most of the Turkish Cypriot population withdrew to enclaves around villages with a turkish majority, with all towns being completely divided between predominantly greek and predominantly turkish neighbourhoods. This relocation was and still is viewed by Turkish Cypriots as a forced expulsion from their homes, while most Greek Cypriots claim that either it happened out of free will or it was forced by the TMT. The enclaves formed a separate administration centering around Vice President Küçük, and demands for complete separation of the two communities began.

Attempts of the Cypriot National Guard under control of General Grivas, who was acting under the mandate given to Cyprus by the UN, to re-capture a beach-head at Kokkina which would enable a Turkish military supply route caused the intervention of the Turkish airforce which bombed the area with rockets, bombs and Napalm. A Turkish naval invasion was being prepared. In reply to this, Makarios threatened that unless these air attacks and invasion were called off within two hours he would order an attack on every Turkish Cypriot paramilitary stronghold on the island. In the end US President Lyndon B. Johnson intervened and threatened Turkey with retaliation, and lacking direct military support from Greece and the Soviet Union, Grivas was forced to recall his forces. A UN mediated ceasefire was accepted by both Cyprus and Turkey afterwards.

Greece then despatched 10,000–20,000 soldiers to Cyprus at the request of the Cyprus government to help it fulfil the mandate the UN had given it. By this time the TMT had over 10,000 well armed paramilitaries at its disposal who had been recruited from the Turkish Cypriot community and whose weapons were smuggled in by Turkey.

From the conflict to the Turkish Invasion

In 1964/5 two major attempts to settle Cyprus by outside mediation failed: Dean Acheson proposed giving Cyprus the choice of unity with Greece, in exchange for self-administration of some predominantly Turkish Cypriot areas and a Turkish sovereign military base on the Karpas peninsula. George Papandreou's comment was : "We are offered a building with only being asked for the penthouse", however both his son and minister Andreas Papandreou and Makarios were not satisfied considering it a partition plan. The UN mediator's report (26 March 1965) foresaw that Cyprus renounce a union with Greece by popular referendum (not only were the wages higher on Cyprus, but also there was not an overall support for enosis even among the Greek Cypriots). Rejecting the Turkish proposal of a federation, it proposed a unitary constitutional system that embodied generous provision for minority rights, some of them of a transitional nature until Turks would have been more integrated into the Cypriot community. This attempt was instantly rejected by the Turks as being "grossly partisan" in its conclusions.

Following the military coup d'état in Greece in 1967 and the installation of an American backed junta, Turkish Cypriot paramilitary action intensified as the Turkish military saw an opportunity to form a bridgehead in the south. Turkish paramilitaries occupied positions on the high ground above Ayios Theodoros, the neighbouring village to Kofinou and thus prevented access to the junction of the Larnaka to Limasol main highway. Cypriot police patrols that tired to keep the junction open were repeatedly fired at and eventually armed conflict resulted prompting an appeal from the President of the Security Council on 24 November 1967. American intervention led to the withdrawal of the Greek army division. President Makarios distanced himself from his earlier enosis convictions in his 1968 presidential campaign and argued for the independence of Cyprus. There were negotiations between the two communities and there was relative peace until 1974. The Greek junta, however, began supporting armed Anti-Makarios groups with the backing of the American CIA such as Ethniko Metopo (National Front) and EOKA B.

In 1971, General Grivas returned to Cyprus and started a guerilla war against Makarios resurrecting EOKA (as EOKA B) which he led until his death in January 1974.

The Turkish invasion

During the spring of 1974, Cypriot intelligence found evidence that EOKA B was planning a coup and was being supplied, controlled, and funded by the military government in Athens. Early in July, Makarios wrote to the president of Greece, accusing the junta of plotting against his life and against the government of Cyprus.

In the autumn of 1973 there had been a further military coup in Athens in which the original Greek junta had been replaced by one still more obscurantist headed in fact by the Chief of Military Police, Brigadier Ioannides, though the actual head of state was General Phaedon Gizikis. Makarios wrote to President Gizikis on 2 July 1974 in a letter which he made public complaining bluntly that 'cadres of the Greek military regime support and direct the activities of the 'EOKA B' terrorist organization'. The Greek Government's immediate reply was to order the go-ahead to the conspiracy that had been long maturing against Archbishop Makarios. On 15 July 1974 the National Guard, led by its Greek officers, overthrew the Government with the support of the United States CIA and Henry Kissinger who believed that Makarios was too pro-Russian.

Makarios narrowly escaped death in the attack. He fled the presidential palace and went to Pafos, where the British managed to retrieve him and smuggle him out of the country.

In the meantime, the EOKA B member Nicos Sampson was declared provisional president of the new government after Glafkos Clerides who was the coupists original candidate declined the offer at the last moment.

After unsuccessfully trying to get support from one of the other guarantor forces – Britan -, Turkey invaded on July 20, 1974, with troops landing shortly before dawn at Kyrenia (Girne) on the northern coast. Ankara claimed that it was invoking its right under the Treaty of Guarantee to protect the Turkish Cypriots and guarantee the independence of Cyprus – a claim which is still being contested by Greeks and Greek Cypriots. The operation, codenamed 'Atilla', is known in the North as 'the 1974 Peace Operation'.

Democracy was restored in Cyprus eight days after the coup against Makarios. By the time the UN Security Council was able to obtain a cease-fire on the 22 July the Turkish forces had only secured a narrow corridor between Kyrenia and Nicosia, which they succeeded in widening during the next few days in violation of the cease-fire. At a conference on 14 August 1974, Turkey demanded from the Cypriot government to accept its plan for a federal state, with 34% of the territory under Turkish Cypriot control. When the Cypriot president Clerides asked for 36 to 48 hours in order to consult with Athens and with Greek Cypriot leaders, the Turkish Foreign Minister denied Clerides that opportunity on the grounds that Makarios and others would notoriously use it to play for still more time. An hour and a half after the conference broke up, the new Turkish attack began. It rapidly occupied even more than was asked for at Geneva. Thirty-six-and a-half per cent of the land came under Turkish occupation reaching as far south as the Louroujina salient. In the process the Turkish forces brutally ethnically cleansed 200,000 Greek Cypriots who made up 82% of the population from their homes and after repeated threats by Turkey that it would bomb the free areas the Cyprus government and United Nations consented to the transfer of 60,000 Turkish Cypriots to settle in the north.

The ceasefire line from 1974 today separates the two communities on the island, and is commonly referred to as the Green Line (or Atilla Line).

Human Rights Violations

In 1976 and again in 1983 the European Commission of Human Rights found Turkey guilty of repeated violations of the European Convention and judged that no reciprocal action had taken place on the part of the Greek Cypriots.

The European Commission of Human Rights reports of 1976 and 1983 state the following:

"Having found violations of a number of Articles of the Convention, the Commission notes that the acts violating the Convention were exclusively directed against members of one of two communities in Cyprus, namely the Greek Cypriot community. It concludes by eleven votes to three that Turkey has thus failed to secure the rights and freedoms set forth in these Articles without discrimination on the grounds of ethnic origin, race, religion as required by Article 14 of the Convention."

20,000 Greek Cypriots who were enclaved in the occupied Karpass peninsula in 1975 were subjected by the Turks to systematic violations of their basic human rights so that by 2001 when the European Court of Human Rights found Turkey guilty of the systematic violation of 14 articles of the European Convention of Human Rights in its judgment of Cyprus v. Turkey (application no. 25781/94) less than 600 still remained. In the same judgment Turkey was found guilty of violating the rights of the Turkish Cypriots by authorising the trial of civilians by a military court.

Since the Turkish invasion and occupation of the northern third of the island over 120,000 illegal Turkish colonists have been imported from Anatolia in violation of Article 49 of the Geneva Convention, to occupy the homes of the Greek Cypriot refugees.

Approximately 70,000 Turkish Cypriots have been forced to emigrate from the occupied areas because of hardship brought on by the isolation of the subordinate local administration.

Negotiations and developments between 1974 and 1979

How the negotiations began

The Turkish military invasion changed the attitude of the United Nations towards the conflict on the island. In resolution No. 353 (external link), the UN Security Council called upon all states to "respect the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus" and demanded "an immediate end to foreign military intervention" as well as the "withdrawal ... of foreign military personnel present otherwise than under the authority of international agreements" (remark: the Turkish government claimed that their intervention was within the guarantee treaties, something which is heavily contested by the Greek government). After the second military intervention of Turkey on Cyprus, right after the failed negotiations in Geneva, the UN in its general assembly resolution 3212 demanded negotiations, which eventually took place in 1975.

Results of the negotiations

On February 12, 1977, Makarios and Rauf Denktaş signed an agreement laying the basis for further negotiations. Both sides agreed on their common aim to form an independent and bicommunal federal republic, stating that the definition of respective territory should be made according to the principles of economic potential, productivity and land ownership. On March 19, 1979, Kyprianou – successor of the late Makarios – and Denktaş concluded an agreement consisting of 10 major points. In this agreement, both parties agreed that the agreement dating from 1977 and the UN resolutions should form the basis of further negotiations, and that human rights as well as the civil rights of all citizens should be respected. Both parties agreed that the independence, sovereignty and non-alignment of Cyprus should be upheld; and it was also agreed that neither the island nor part of it would search to unite with any country, and that it was one country with no room for either enosis or taksim.

Negotiations and developments between 1980 and 1997

UN Resolution No. 37/253

On May 16, 1983, the UN General Assembly adopted resolution no. 37/253, initiated by the Spyros Kyprianou (external link). The Greek Cypriots celebrated it as a victory on international level, while the Turkish Cypriots called it an "execution order". The resolution demanded "the immediate withdrawal of all occupation forces from the Republic of Cyprus", welcomed the proposal for total demilitarization made by the Greek Cypriots and considered "that the de facto situation created by the force of arms should not be allowed to influence or in any way affect the solution of the problem of Cyprus".

The Turkish Cypriots' reaction was to declare the independence of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). Only three days later, the UN Security Council declared this declaration of independence to be invalid. Ever since, only Turkey has recognised the TRNC as an independent state.

The New York negotiations

In September 1984, the negotiations continued in New York. At the end of the third round of negotiations, on November 24, 1984, the Secretary-General made a proposal based on an offer from Turkey for an independent, non-aligned, federal and bizonal republic, in which both communities were to enjoy equal political status. The proposal also included the conceding of 25% of Turkish Cypriot-administered territory to the Greek Cypriots and it also provided for the partial withdrawal of Turkish troops. Rauf Denktaş accepted the agreement with the provision that the Greek Cypriot side should accept it without any changes. A breakthrough seemed possible only to those who were so short sighted as to ignore the concerns of the Greek Cypriots. In January 1985, when the agreement was to be signed, Spyros Kyprianou voiced his objection with the backing of Greek Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou, as the agreement only provided for a partial withdrawal of the Turkish troops, not a total one. He asked for a reopening of the negotiations. Kyprianou's objection was met with support from the vast majority of the Greek Cypriot population who felt that such an agreement was neither democratic nor did it respect their basic human rights. The Turkish Cypriots considered this position a rejection of the solution in form of a bizonal federal state. A new proposal worked out by the UN Secretary-General Pérez de Cuéllar was rejected by Denktaş in April 1985, the reason being that the Turkish Cypriot side had not taken part in the working out of this plan.

The negotiations were stalled for a few years. Only when George Vasiliou was elected president of the Republic of Cyprus in 1988 were negotiations reopened. On January 30, 1989, the general conditions for the foundation of a federal republic and the solution of the Cyprus issue were presented to the UN. The talks between Vassiliou and Denktaş were conducted without help of the UN, but did not produce any results, as no compromise could be achieved regarding the level of sovereignty of the two constituent states.

The set of ideas

The set of ideas, worked out by UN Secretary-General Pérez de Cuéllar, was the most extensive and detailed proposal for the solution of the Cyprus conflict at that time. Its intention was to have both parties distance themselves from former positions. It provided for the establishment of three basic rights; it denied, however, the Greek Cypriot demands that all Greek Cypriots should have the right to return to their former homes. The treaties of guarantee dating form 1960 were confirmed, leaving both Greece and Turkey with the right to station troops "of equal force" on the island. Vassiliou agreed to the set of ideas; this time, the negotiations were blocked by Denktaş, who rejected the planned border drawing.

More measures taken by the UN

After the failure of the set of ideas, the UN put a stress on confidence-building measures on Cyprus. These included a perceivable reduction of Turkish troops on Cyprus, a reduction of Greek Cypriot military expenses, bicommunal contacts on expert level, cooperation on the issue of fresh water supply (a topic problematic for both sides) and on the reopening of the airport of Nikosia, as well as the return of the abandoned city of Varosha to the Greek Cypriots. After a promising start of negotiations, these proposals failed to produce any results. The Greek Cypriots feared that these confidence-building measures would recognise the existence of a Turkish Cypriot state. In the end, the Greek Cypriot president Glafkos Klerides aborted the negotiations, accusing the UN to have unilaterally concluded deals with the Turkish Cypriots.

The application for accession to the European Union by the Republic of Cyprus in 1990 introduced another controversial topic into the discussion of the Cyprus situation. The Turkish Cypriot government as well as the Turkish one protested, claiming that the Greek Cypriot government could not claim sole representation of the island. While the Greek Cypriots praised the positive effect the accession would have on the solution of the Cyprus issue, Denktaş rigorously rejected this argument and put forth that the conditions for his approval to the plan were EU membership for Turkey and the solution of the Cyprus question.

In June 1997, Klerides and Denktaş met in New York; the talks yielded no results, however both politicians agreed on discussing humanitarian questions during the following round of talks. The last round of negotiations took part in Switzerland in 1997, again without any results: The EU in the meantime had decided to invite the Republic of Cyprus for accession negotiations.

Endeavours on reunification and accession to the EU

Elements of a Solution

A possible soulution will affect these elements

• The 40,000 Turkish occupation troops who are in Cyprus in violation of over 130 UN resolutions and the UN charter.
• The 120,000 Turkish colonists who have been brought to occupied Cyprus by Turkey in violation Article 49 of the Geneva Convention.
• The 200,000 Greek Cypriot refugees who the European Court of Human Rights has judged are still the legal owners of 90% of the land and property in the occupied areas.
• The Greek and Turkish Cypriots who occupy property belonging to members of the other community.
• The territory under Turkish occupation.
• The constitution of the Republic of Cyprus.
• The UN peace keeping force.
• The British Sovereign Base Areas (SBA's)
• The European Union

Cyprus' EU accession

On December 13, 2002, the European Union's Copenhagen Summit ratified the accession of Cyprus, Malta, and eight Eastern European countries (cf. 2004 Enlargement) to take place on May 1, 2004. The Cypriot parliament ratified the EU accession treaty on July 28, 2003. The internationally unrecognised TRNC is not a member of the EU; following international law, however, the northern part of the island is part of the EU, because the whole island joined in 2004. Thus, the inhabitants of the northern part (at least those that held the Cypriot citizenship in 1974 and their descendants) have the right to obtain a EU passport. Technically, the EU laws apply for the north as well as for the South. The main problem in the ongoing negotiations about the status of the island is not only the territorial and strategic situation (including the high number of Turkish troops), but also the status of the Anatolian settlers that moved to northern Cyprus after the separation. A disputed issue is the handling of properties acquired by British, Swiss and Germans citizens in the north, who will face legitimate claims of return or reimbursement from their former Greek Cypriot owners. Both parties – the Anatolian settlers and the foreign citizens – ceded full authority to UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan for the solution of these questions, yet only the inhabitants of the northern part responded in favor of the solution proposed at the referendum in April 2004.

The UN plan for the reunification of Cyprus (Annan Plan)

The proposed government form was a loose confederation of two associated states. The northern Turkish Cypriot State would emcompass about 28.5% of the total surface, the southern Greek Cypriot State 71.5% (currently the Turkish military holds holds about 36% of the total surface. It is claimed that 90% of the legitimate population and property owners are Greek Cypriot refugees). Kofi Annan had presented two different maps for the partitioning.

Each part would have had its own parliament, with a bicameral parliament on the federal level. In the Chamber of Deputies, the Turkish Cypriots would have been represented as more than double their actual proportion of the population (one quarter Turkish Cypriots, three qaurters Greek Cypriots). The Senate would have consisted of equal parts of members of each ethnic group. There would have been a rotating presidency and each community would have had the right to veto all federal legislation.

A demilitarisation was envisioned: a reduction of the stationed Turkish troops from 35,000 to 6,000 was planned after six years; Greece would have had the right to station 2,000 troops on the island. Both states, as well as the British Crown, would have remained guarantors of the peace and all of the 120,000 Turkish colonists, would have been given full citizenship.

Final negotiations and referendum

At the end of the final negotiations in Switzerland in March 2004, a consensus was not achieved. The aim of the negotiations was to reunify the island before the Enlargement of the EU in 2004. Under leadership of the UN and most especially Kofi Annan, the plan was revised several times. The plan which was seen by the vast majorty of the Greek Cypriots as legitimising the Turkish invasion, ethnic cleasing and colonisation of Cyprus in violation of UN resolutions, from the very first day it was announced, provided for a loose confederation of the two parts, which was supposed to be based on the Swiss model, but critisized as having nothing in common with it or any federal model by Greek Cypriot legal experts, politicians and commentators. The plan included many constraints for the Greek Cypriots, which were claimed to potentially result in serious permanent violations of their democratic and human rights, most significantly a limited right of return to the northern confederate state with no right to vote unless they spoke fluent Turkish. On the other hand, conservative Turkish Cypriots, led by Rauf Denktash, were critical about the plan and claimed that it did not give the Turkish Cypriots enough power. The Greek Cypriots argued that the percentage quotas and restrictions envisaged by the Annan Plan would have had little or no detrimental effect on the Turkish Cypriot minority but instead favoured them and were allegedly calculated by Denktash and Talat to prevent the Greek Cypriot majority from enjoying their basic human and democratic rights, made them into second class EU citizens, made the country ungovernable, and in effect turned Cyprus into two separate states that were protectorates of Greece and Turkey rather than provide for unification. Kofi Annan who descried the plan as "uniquely balanced" was accused of giving Turkey everything it wanted in order to obtain a yes vote while deliberately disregarding the "legitimate concerns" of the Greek Cypriots. Turkish Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul is quoted as saying; "Turkey will maintain troops till the end in Cyprus... Sovereignty was not obtained but the sovereignty of Greek Cypriots was taken from them." (Hurriyetim 05/04/05)

The referendum on April 24, 2004, put an end to the plan: Tasos Papadopoulos, the president of Republic of Cyprus, urged the Greek Cypriot community to vote no in the referendum on the UN's 11th hour revised settlement plan. For the plan to be put in effect, both parts of the island would have had to approve it. While the Turkish Cypriots approved the plan with a two third majority, only one quarter of the Greek Cypriots voted in favor. As a result, the whole island joined the EU on May 1, 2004 with the EU acquis suspended in the occupied north.

Detailed results:

The Aftermath

Following the 'No' vote by the South, The European Union Parliamentary Assembly in Resolution no. 1376 (2004), stated:

"The international community, and in particular the Council of Europe and the European Union, cannot ignore or betray the expressed desire of a majority of Turkish Cypriots for greater openness and should take rapid and appropriate steps to encourage it. The Turkish Cypriots' international isolation must cease...The United Nations should also consider whether the resolutions on which the sanctions are based are still justified."

Efforts by the EU to end the economic isolation of North Cyprus have been blocked by The Republic of Cyprus. Instead the relase of €259m in aid by the EU has been endorsed by the Cypriot goverment providing it has control on how it is spent. The restrictions it wishes to impose on the relase of aid will mean only 15%-20% of the North will benefit.

On 6 April 2005 The European Court of Human Rights declared the case of Xenides-Arestis v Turkey to be admissable. They noted that "the Annan Plan would have been a significant development and break-through in inter-communal negotiations had it come into force" but that "even the adoption of the plan would not have afforded immediate redress" of Greek Cypriot property rights. Greek Cypriots cite this as justification for their 'no' vote.

On 17 April 2005, the Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktaş, was replaced by Mehmet Ali Talat.

All recent attempts to re-start negotiations under the auspices of the UN have failed despite requests by both Greek and Turkish Cypriot sides.

Currently the EU has suspended the Acquis Communitaire in the occupied areas but has decided to allow limited travel of persons and goods in both directions, for the first time since 1974 under strict conditions following the adoption of the Green Line regulation.

External links

• Aspects of the Cyprus Problem from The Republic of Cyprus Press and Information Office
• A detailed Cyprus Problem site from The TFSC and Turkey